It was with no small trepidation that I felt I may have some weaker times ahead at the point of my last posting in March 2011. Posting on the strangeness of the investment industry from the inside felt a bit odd (so I stopped doing it), but I think it's well understood, so perhaps I can blog away without refrain.
Of the 3 stocks mentioned last time (Man Group, Game Group and Lo-Q) two were fairly disastrous and one extremely good. The latter, as it turned out, was by far my largest position, so performance has held up pretty well considering my hit rate of winners to losers remains stubbornly around 50% since inception.
Lo-Q gradually went from unloved (5x ex-cash earnings) to somewhat liked (12x earnings) to in favour (20x earnings - where I exited) to rabidly adored (32x prior year earnings, where it stands today). I'm not sure if I should be kicking myself for kicking Lo-Q out at 240p (having averaged in at 94p/share), given that it now stands at around 388p. Clearly I would have made more by hanging on longer, but my condolence lies in the concept that your curse as a value investors is selling too early, whilst the alternative curse of the growth investor would be selling too late. Of the two curses, I would rather err on the side of caution and prudence, but it's still annoying seeing a stock go up 50% after you feel the best has passed.
Man Group fell from the 274p that I felt was 'cheap' to stand at 82p at present - a fall of 70%; ouch! I've been adding as it fell, which I could have been more patient with having told myself 80p was where the margin of safety seemed appropriately wide to invest given asset outflows and weak performance from AHL. With 10p/share of 'normal' management fee income and 15p/share of 'normal' performance fee income, I still cling stubbornly to the belief that the shares are cheap, but I freely admit that this is more speculation than investment on the basis that profits are not linked to consumer behaviour, or other predictable phenomena. It seems like a mispriced bet, so it stays in. Amazingly, I'm actually up 4% on a cash basis having originally paid £1.92/share for my first lots, and the business having paid out 86.5p/share in dividends since late 2008 (in addition to a bit of selling and buying along the way).
Game Group proved to be the next HMV and a 'value trap'. Although used extensively, this term really should read simply as 'mistake'. A stock is hardly cheap because the historic dividend yield is high, or P/E ratio low. It is cheap because the future cashflows will be more on a per-share basis than the current price per share. Ratios are a good starting point, but do little more than give a title to the picture - let alone paint it in its entirety. Many so called value investors would be wise to take heed of this credo.
To the above point, I should also add one major point that I had almost entirely missed in reading about value investing from older books, such as those by Ben Graham. A stock need not necessarily be 'expensive' by the same token as above, simply because it has a low dividend yield, or high ratio of price to earnings. It remains a reasonable headline to check the potential relationship of price to value with - but it really is just a starting point. Given that markets are mostly right most of the time, a 'cheap' stock is also likely to be a poor investment versus many 'expensive' stocks. The trick of comparing price to value is a lot more tricky than it first appears, which I suppose is why the game is so much fun!
And to performance and current ideas. I'm really not doing well on the ideas front, but at least performance has come up trumps. 2011 ended with a 32% gain. This was lower than the performance for the year to 11 March, and I was up over 50% in July - which was probably a good signal to cash out on a few ideas! So I actually ended up being rather disappointed with the 32% gain for 2012. The FTSE with dividends fell by 1%, so it was an outperformance that I expected not to repeat again, and I'm certainly proud of it overall.
2013 looks like it will end with similar disappointment and a current 44% gain for the year versus 12% for the index with dividends (an oddly similar 32% outperformance for the year). The performance came in two lumps: Lo-Q in January and a decision to commit capital to GVC Holdings by the middle of the year gave the portfolio quite a boost in September as the stock jumped 71% during the month on news that they were to acquire a portion of Sportingbet. My holding in GVC never matched that of Lo-Q in terms of concentration as the downside was a lot higher, but the percentage returns from the investment look like they will be higher as I am already up 134% and the shares are yet to reach what I figure as their fair value of around 340p each (they are currently suspended due to the transaction with Sportingbet at a price of 233.5p).
Career-wise, not posting since March 2011 has brought about a few changes. My career as an analyst in a hedge fund was brought to an abrupt halt in July of that year as the fund I was working on was downsized from two people to one. I then spent 15 months unsuccessfully looking for a new role before finally ending up on the sell-side with an excellent boutique firm serving up ideas to some of London's top hedge fund and traditional investment managers. Along the way I had extraordinary help from one of London's best fund managers, who seemed to think I might be a fun project to help find a new role for (my current role was found through his friend, so a job well done!). I posted a while back that I looked forward to finding people to mentor me along the way to being a better investor, and the above logic of searching for not only cheap, but also sound, businesses certainly comes from some great chats with my new friend.
Sunday, December 30, 2012
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