Friday, March 11, 2011

On Being Right... And Being Wrong

What fun it is to make money - I mean that seriously. You work at it for 8 years (since my I got my first investment job) and I think eventually you develop an edge. Investing really is pretty simple: you analyse the prospects for various companies and buy shares in those businesses when you are getting more quality (or value) than you are paying for. If the company is too difficult to analyse, you move on. You certainly don't need to know about the whole stock market to invest in a few great businesses. Or even to know what the stock market, or general business climate will do next.

It's been an interesting year, and I've learnt a great deal about the inner workings of Myopic Mr Market. The whole game is one played by practitioners that are acting on the incentives in front of them. Essentially a firm can collect in assets with adequate performance, but will probably lose assets fast with poor performance. So asset management firms in general want fund managers to do averagely over the risk of them performing poorly. Average managers get their jobs and do adequately, whilst the firms charge customers a very pleasant 1% on hundreds of millions of pounds. If they just do enough to not be terrible, the manager will probably have a lucrative career and keep their job.

Society seems to not notice the shockingly high fees it pays for this average performance, which is worse than average once fees are taken into account (potentially 14% of the rise in the stock market ends up in the pockets of firms that 'help' society to invest their capital). Outperformance by simply buying a low cost index tracker is a no-brainer for most investors, yet they still give money to large firms that churn through their portfolios and charge a fee for doing so.

Investing may be simple, but it isn't easy. Working in a busy office with Bloomberg screens and constant price updates is an extremely poor environment for performing reasoned analysis with a quiet mind and in a cold emotional state. The market noise is deafening, and small movements in markets can bring about emotional reactions that cloud clear judgement. All it needs to be about is thinking about price and value, and yet predictions fly all over the place and the merry-go-round of the relative performance game keeps portfolios churning and commissions and spreads eating away at returns before even the first investment decision can be assessed as either good or bad.

In my own portfolio I decided that the performance I was trying to show was less important than maximising my post-tax returns (surely the goal of any long-term investor). So from the below 5 stocks I wittled the portfolio down to just 3. Along the way I bought and sold shares in Velosi and GVC Holdings. The former I sold before it was bought for a 54% premium to my initial price (how annoying!) and the latter is still an interesting one with a potential 20% dividend yield selling for around 5-6x earnings, but not a cinch by any means.

The three I held on to were: Lo-Q, Man Group and Game Group. Lo-Q fell soon after I wondered if I was due a 'correction' - turns out I was! But during the year the founder has hired a very pleasant new CEO who promptly dismissed the under-performing sales director and updated investors with what I regard as a very exciting new strategy. The stock is now at 158p and I think it may still be significantly below fair value. The sales director leaving was not regarded as good news by the market, so my 2010 annual performance looks relatively bad as by the end of the year 75% of the portfolio was in this one stock. However the 61% price rise since the end of the year has made up for a poor 2010.

Man Group is up at 274p now and is still cheap on the basis that the flagship AHL fund is unlikely to be 'broken' as far as I'm concerned and the amazing distribution channels remain in tact with hedge fund assets set to rise by 50% over the coming few years, with the bulk of new assets flowing to larger more established firms with strong distribution and experience in structuring, compliance, and so on.

Game Group is in the doldrums at 60p, now yielding 9.4%. The question is, is this the next HMV (a competitor that is about to go bankrupt). Or will HMV's demise lead to higher sales on a relatively fixed cost base. And then is it fair to take recent trough earnings and put them on a P/E of 5.6 when the release of a new generation of gaming consoles could double profits for the group? On the other hand, you can expect to get a few wrong, so maybe this is my dud for the time being. At 3% of my portfolio I can handle it, whereas with Lo-Q now at 80% that idea being wrong would be harder to take.

I'm quite proud of my returns so far. As at today's date (6 years from inception), the portfolio is up 196%, or 19.8% annualised against a rise in the FTSE with dividends of 49% (6.9% annualised) and in the S&P of 23% (3.5% annualised). Since the end of March 2010 (1 year ago) the portfolio is up 29.4% and since the end of March 2008 (3 years ago) it is up 121% (30.2% annualised). The first two years of basically just holding Berkshire and not buying it at much of a discount really hurt the performance over that period, but lessons were learned (and by reading their annual reports each year some hugely important lessons were learned) and the portfolio has started to act a lot better of late.